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I. INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture loves the environment; it depends on natural resources to thrive.1 
But agriculture resists environmental law; it is best to keep environmental costs 
off the balance sheet. As a result, the greatest stewards often ask lawmakers for 
exemptions to environmental regulation,2 seek regulatory favoritism from 
agencies, and sue regulators for expansive interpretations of statutory or 
regulatory language or narrow interpretations of favorable statutory or regulatory 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Associate Dean of Faculty, University of Nebraska College of Law. 
Thank you to the University of the Pacific Law Review for their editorial assistance and the University of 
Nebraska College of Law for its support. Mark A. Ryan, Terrence J. Centner, and Jesse Richardson provided 
valuable feedback. 
1.  It also loves laws that allocate natural-resource rights to it, often seeking preferred status among users. 
Water law is an example. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-294(1)(i) (2020) (prohibiting permanent transfers of water 
rights from agricultural use to other types of uses). 
2.  Jacqueline Comito et al., Stewards, Businessmen, and Heroes?: Role Conflict and Contradiction 
Among Row-Crop Farmers in an Age of Environmental Uncertainty, 72 HUM. ORG. 283 (2013) (evaluating 
farmers’ stewardship claim from an anthropological perspective in light of the conflicting role of farm profits 
and concluding that farmers use feed-the-world heroism to resolve the moral conflict in favor of profitmaking). 
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exemptions.3 
The most famous article on agriculture and environmental law is J.B. Ruhl’s 
Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, written in 2000.4 
After more than twenty years, very little has changed. Production has intensified 
and environmental policy’s blind spot for agriculture remains. A push for ethanol 
production increased farm profitability during the most recent ethanol boom for 
crop producers,5 and profitability remains relatively high.6 This boom did not 
spark interest in implementing previously unaffordable conservation practices. 
Rather, it drove the push for less conservation, bringing land into production 
from the Conservation Reserve Program and from lands that had never been 
broken.7 And as crop prices have risen, livestock production has been squeezed 
between high feed costs and a powerful and small class of livestock buyers. As a 
result, livestock operations have gotten bigger, with larger environmental 
impacts.8 
The future probably contains more of the same. The corn ethanol boom and 
its high hopes for cellulosic feedstocks may have been a bridge to nowhere. As 
the auto industry moves to electrifying transportation, new uses for field crops 
will likely develop. The most likely candidate for continuing consumption of the 
current levels of field-crop production is probably increased livestock production 
domestically and abroad, especially as we pursue the goal of putting meat in the 
 
3.  The agricultural sector also has a long history of seeking compensation for environmentally beneficial 
practices, even as it resists conditional funding branded as risk management. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten 
System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 240–51 (2009). For a proposal to expand conditional funding, see Linda Breggin & D. 
Bruce Myers Jr., Subsidies with Responsibilities: Placing Stewardship and Disclosure Conditions on 
Government Payments to Large-Scale Commodity Crop Operations, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487 (2013). 
4.  J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 
(2000). 
5.  James A. Duffield et al., Ethanol Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 53 S.D. L. REV. 425 (2008). 
6.  2021 Farm Sector Income Forecast, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-
economy/farm-sector-income-finances/farm-sector-income-forecast/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2021) (on file with 
the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
7.  ROGER CLAASSEN ET AL., USDA, ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT NO. 120, GRASSLAND TO 
CROPLAND CONVERSION IN THE NORTHERN PLAINS: THE ROLE OF CROP INSURANCE, COMMODITY, AND 
DISASTER PROGRAMS (2011); Tyler J. Lark et al., Cropland Expansion in the United States Produces Marginal 
Yields at High Costs to Wildlife, 11 NATURE COMM. (2020); Michael C. Wimberly et al., Cropland Expansion 
and Grassland Loss in the Eastern Dakotas: New Insights from a Farm-Level Survey, 63 LAND USE POL’Y 160 
(2017). 
8.  Growth in the swine industry is one example. USDA, ISSN NO. 1949-1921, QUARTERLY HOGS AND 
PIGS (2020); see also James M. MacDonald, Tracking the Consolidation of U.S. Agriculture, 42 APPLIED ECON. 
PERSP. & POL’Y 361 (2020). Poultry is another. SHEILA E. PURDUM & RICHARD K. KOELSCH, NEBRASKA 
EXTENSION PUBLICATIONS, NO. G2309, NEBRASKA POULTRY EXPANSION (2018); Ken Anderson, Nebraska’s 
Livestock Industry Poised for Growth, BROWNFIELD AG NEWS (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://brownfieldagnews.com/news/nebraskas-livestock-industry-poised-for-growth/ (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Margaret Kyakuwaire et al., How Safe is Chicken Litter for Land 
Application as an Organic Fertilizer?: A Review, 16 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH (2019), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6801513/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
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stomachs of an expanding global middle class. 
While expansions and intensification exacerbate environmental policy gaps 
(and there are many with agriculture), it has an impact on the political and 
practical feasibility of environmental regulation. On this front, support for 
regulatory approaches may be on the rise. Fewer producers means fewer 
operations to find, regulate, and monitor. Moreover, political resistance may be 
waning. The decline in political resistance is not just because fewer voters are 
growing animals. Rather, more and more people disassociate the bucolic 
countryside (illusive as it is) with animal production,9 and they increasingly see 
commodity landscapes as industrial landscapes, devoid of much of their 
ecological function.10 As a result, agricultural environmental policy may become 
more about regulating a polluting industry than it is about telling farmers what to 
do.11 While a push for better environmental performance is often met with claims 
of economic difficulty and rural development, public sentiment may change in 
important ways as agriculture’s story unfolds.12 In the end, the need for better 
environmental performance remains strong, and the door for demanding better 
performance may be opening.13 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) was one demand for better environmental 
performance. Agriculture did not heed that demand. From statutory exemptions 
concerning wetlands regulation to definitional exclusions on key terms, the farm 
lobby’s fingerprints are all over this hallmark of environmental law. Where 
statutory coverage potentially exists, agricultural interests have successfully 
waged war over regulatory implementation. In fact, agriculture’s success at 
 
9.  Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 872–73 (1995). 
10.  BRUCE BABBITT, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS, chs. 3–4 (2007). 
11.  See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water 
Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 584 (2005) 
(discussing the politics of pollution control and agriculture). 
12.  As for evidence of rural impact of livestock production, Joseph A. Herriges, Silvia Secchi & Bruce 
A. Babcock, Living with Hogs in Iowa: The Impact of Livestock Facilities on Rural Residential Property 
Values, 81 LAND ECON. 530 (2005). And for an account of rural landscapes from a property perspective, see 
Jessica A. Shoemaker, Fee Simple Failures: Rural Landscapes and Race, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3714326 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13.  The environmental impact of livestock and agricultural production so well-known at this point, it 
hardly needs to be substantiated. But the problem is not getting any better. A good collection of resources can 
be found in Emily Kenyon, Note, Enough of This Manure: Why the EPA Needs to Define the Agricultural 
Stormwater Exemption to Limit the Runoff from the Alt Court, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187 (2017); in the technical 
literature, see JoAnn Burkholder et al., Impacts of Waste from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations on 
Water Quality, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308 (2007); Patricia M. Glibert, From Hogs to HABs: Impacts of 
Industrial Farming in the US on Nitrogen and Phosphorus and Greenhouse Gas Pollution, 150 
BIOGEOCHEMISTRY 139 (2020); Christopher S. Jones et al., Livestock Manure Driving Stream Nitrate, 48 
AMBIO 1143 (2019); Christopher S. Jones, Philip W. Gassman & Keith E. Schilling, The Urgent Need to 
Address Nutrient Imbalance Problems in Iowa’s High-Density Livestock Regions, AGRIC. POL’Y REV., Fall 
2019, art. 3, https://www.card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/pdf/fall-2019.pdf (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review); Zach Raff & Andrew Meyer, CAFOs and Surface Water Quality: Evidence from 
Wisconsin (Jan. 25, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3379678 (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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resisting the CWA explains its enlistment as a veteran property-rights (or anti-
environmentalist) warrior to fight the “expansion” of “waters of the United 
States,”14 even though the subject has almost no legal or practical impact on 
farmland ownership or use.15 
Some aspects of these fights are understandable. They arise because water 
quality is a difficult subject to regulate. The difficulty stems from water’s 
importance and complexity. Stakeholders are found everywhere, and polluting 
activities are scattered throughout the hydrologic system. As a result, the subject 
defies the geographic boundaries of government and wreaks havoc on its 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. So it is expected that the CWA, its 
regulations, and its case law are unclear and complicated.16 
As with any legally complex subject, changes in one area have effects in 
others. Revelations can provide new understandings of how things fit together. 
This Article explores an example: indirect discharges. Recent case law is 
clarifying the scope of the CWA, and it has the potential to clarify the CWA’s 
coverage of agricultural polluters, perhaps assisting with some of the 
environmental challenges of the day. 
In April 2020, the United States Supreme Court decided County of Maui v. 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund,17 which dealt with injection wells releasing pollutants 
underground where groundwater carried them to navigable waters. The Court 
embraced a functional-equivalence standard to discern the difference between 
unregulated sub-terranean wastewater disposal and a regulated addition of 
pollutants to navigable waters.18 
The problem the Court confronted in Hawaii Wildlife Fund is a problem that 
has faced agricultural applications of the CWA for decades. Ever since 
“concentrated animal feeding operations” (“CAFOs”) were included in the 
CWA’s definition of point source, courts have struggled to figure out how to 
regulate them.19 For CAFOs, the release of pollutants is unlike many of the other 
 
14.  See generally Articles and Videos about WOTUS from the American Farm Bureau Federation, AM. 
FARM BUREAU FED’N, https://www.fb.org/related/WOTUS (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing articles and videos about the agriculture community’s battles 
over “waters of the United States”). 
15.  I sit on the Lower Platte South Natural Resources District in Lincoln, Nebraska. I often hear farmers 
railing against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which administers the § 404 program, claiming it overreaches 
and threatens their way of life. Farmers do this even though there is practically no impact on farming here that 
would come from defining WOTUS in the way the Obama administration defined it. The reasons for this 
limited impact are beyond the scope of this article, but between the 404(f) exclusions, nationwide permitting, 
and Swampbuster, the likelihood that a producer would violate the CWA, legally and practically, is remote. 16 
U.S.C. § 3821 (2021) (known colloquially as “Swampbuster”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2021) (showing 404(f) 
exemptions); Ruhl, supra note 4, at 327; Jonathan Coppess, A Return to the Crossroads: Farming, Nutrient 
Loss, and Conservation, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 351, 370–72 (2017) (explaining Swampbuster). 
16.  One very good effort to bring clarity to the subject is Robert W. Adler & Brian House, Atomizing the 
Clean Water Act: Ignoring the Whole Statute and Asking the Wrong Questions, 50 ENVTL. L. 45 (2020). 
17.  County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
18.  Id. at 1468. 
19.  See Terence J. Centner, Clarifying NPDES Requirements for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
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industries that the CWA regulates; CAFOs discharge by applying manure to land 
where precipitation often carries pollutants to nearby water bodies. One fighting 
issue has been whether the CWA requires a direct or less-direct link between the 
origin of CAFO pollutants and the CWA’s protected destination—navigable 
waters. This is the same question presented to the Court in Hawaii Wildlife Fund. 
CAFO pollution, however, has been particularly vexing because of the 
agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception to the CWA and the concept of 
nonpoint-source pollution. Hawaii Wildlife Fund provides a means of reconciling 
the ag-stormwater-discharge exemption, the nonpoint-source-pollution concept, 
and the treatment of CAFOs as point-source dischargers involving land 
application. Its functional-equivalence standard unlocks the mystery of CAFO 
discharges. It also may help courts and regulators narrow the scope of the 
agricultural-stormwater-discharge provision, which has been used in ways that 
are inconsistent with both its text and its purpose. Finally, it may provide courts 
and regulators with a clearer understanding of what nonpoint-source pollution is, 
opening the door to greater agricultural coverage under the CWA. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. The first part provides background 
information about the CWA and its agricultural provisions. The second part 
explains the indirect-discharge issue in Hawaii Wildlife Fund and applies the 
Court’s solution to CAFO land-application discharges. In the end, the indirect-
discharge test may change how we think of discharges from CAFOs and other 
agricultural sources. 
Change is needed. Agriculture continues to press the gaps in our 
environmental policy, exploiting forty-year-old political winds.20 Our knowledge 
of ecologic systems has changed. It is sophisticated and evolving, as is the 
expertise associated with agricultural production. Sensing technologies and 
computing capacity aid geospatial data assimilation and analyses in ways that 
create predictive and explanatory models that can be used to understand the 
environmental performance of our agricultural landscapes.21 Indeed, this sort of 
technology is the basis for much of our increased productive capacity. And there 
is very little reason it cannot be deployed to solve the pressing problems of 
agricultural pollution. The law, of course, often plays catch-up with these 
developments, but it can be applied in ways that accommodate advancements in 
our understanding of complex systems. Indeed, it can drive such advancements. 
 
Operations, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 361 (2006). 
20.  John H. Davidson, Factory Fields: Agricultural Practices, Polluted Water and Hypoxic Oceans, 9 
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2004). 
21.  See, e.g., Awoke D. Teshager et al., Assessment of Impacts of Agricultural and Climate Change 
Scenarios on Watershed Water Quantity and Quality, and Crop Production, 20 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. 
SCI. 3325 (2016); Awoke Dagnew Teshager et al., Simulation of Targeted Pollutant-Mitigation-Strategies to 
Reduce Nitrate and Sediment Hotspots in Agricultural Watershed, 607–608 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 1188 (2017); 
Tiffany Lee, Husker Team Leading $6M Project to Study Waterways’ Changing Ecology, NEB. TODAY, 
https://news.unl.edu/newsrooms/today/article/husker-team-leading-6m-project-to-study-waterways-changing-
ecology/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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The CWA is an example of such a law, and Hawaii Wildlife Fund is one example 
of a helpful interpretive development that may accommodate modern water-
quality analysis and drive further technological advances.22 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. CWA Basics 
Section 301 of the CWA generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person.”23 Discharges of pollutants occur when “point sources” add 
pollutants to navigable waters. Point sources are “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”24 
These discharges are allowed, however, if the discharger has a permit. The two 
most common discharge permits are found in §§ 402 and 404 of the CWA.25 
1. Section 404 
Section 404 permits allow the discharge of pollutants that involve the 
placement of dredge and fill material in protected waters. While this Article 
focuses on the § 402 implications of Hawaii Wildlife Fund, the § 404 case law 
informs significant aspects of the regulated origins of pollution (i.e., point 
sources) and the regulated destination (i.e., navigable waters). The point sources 
at issue in the § 404 program are typically pieces of equipment that move dredge 
or fill material and place it “into the navigable waters.”26 Such a placement 
requires a permit because the point sources add pollutants to navigable waters. 
These kinds of discharges require permits that specify the conditions under which 
dredge or fill material can be discharged. 
The § 404 permitting program protects the water quality values of wetlands 
by regulating the discharge of dredge or fill material within them. Those 
discharges often accompany drainage activities. For this protection to happen, 
 
22.  This article focuses on a relatively narrow means of accommodation, focusing on the existence of a 
discharge, the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception and the distinction between point and nonpoint 
sources in light of Hawaii Wildlife Fund. The CWA, however, has other tools and there is a substantial body of 
work on these and other tools. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. 
Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593 (2009); Mary Jane 
Angelo & Jon Morris, Maintaining a Healthy Water Supply While Growing a Healthy Food Supply: Legal 
Tools for Cleaning up Agricultural Water Pollution, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1003 (2013). 
23.  33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2021). One of the most helpful guides to understanding the basics (and some of the 
more advanced subjects) within the CWA is AM. BAR ASS’N, THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Mark A. 
Ryan ed., 4th ed. 2018); see also CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER 
ACT: A SUMMARY OF THE LAW 13 (2016). For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the CWA, 
see Murchison, supra note 11. 
24.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2021). 
25.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2021). 
26.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2021). 
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wetlands must be “navigable waters.” Before the CWA, the term was defined for 
other purposes to involve considerations of actual navigation, which is a channel 
of commerce and obviously something within federal congressional—and thus 
executive—authority. But the statutory definition departed from this definition 
and defined the term as the “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”). WOTUS 
has, in turn, been defined in various ways over the last four decades with three 
major Supreme Court cases.27 
2. Section 402 
Section 402 permits allow the discharge of pollutants that meet several 
requirements, the most important of which are effluent limitations. Two broad 
sorts of effluent limitations exist under the act: technology-based effluent 
limitations and water-quality-based effluent limitations.28 These two categories 
of limitations focus on different things. Technology-based effluent limitations 
control the substance of the discharge. A water quality-based effluent limitation 
focuses on the quality of the receiving water.29 Both are applied through permits 
to limit pollution at its origin. And both assume some point at which effluent 
limitations can improve water quality. 
Technology-based limitations are developed by considering the costs and 
availability of pollution control technology on an industry-by-industry basis. The 
requirement to meet technology-based effluent limitations generally does not 
require that the permittee use any particular technology to attain the limit. Rather, 
the limits dictate the quality of the effluent. The discharger may achieve the 
dictated level of effluent quality through whatever means it deems appropriate. 
This, in turn, drives the development of better pollution-control technologies that, 
when limitations are revisited, will be used to set more stringent but as cost-
effective limits. If no technology-based limitation is promulgated, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has the authority to impose a 
limitation in a permit based on its best professional judgment. 
Water quality-based effluent limitations require states to promulgate water 
quality standards according to the desired use of the navigable waters found 
within the state. Depending on the designated use (e.g., as a cold-water fishery), 
different levels of pollution will be allowed. If a body of water fails to meet the 
 
27.  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730, 739 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 132–35 (1985); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at ch. 2. Further developments can be found here: 
STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44585, EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF “WATERS OF THE 
UNITED STATES” IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2019); Jesse J. Richardson, Tiffany Dowell Lashmet & Gatlin 
Squires, Turtles All the Way Down: A Clearer Understanding of the Scope of Waters of the United States Based 
on the United States Supreme Court Decisions, WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
28.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312 (2021). 
29.  This method of control was originally implemented in the 1965 act. In 1972, the focus shifted to 
technology-based limitations on effluent and that focus has largely remained in the 1977 and 1987 amendments. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at ch. 1. 
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requisite water quality standard, further limitations can be placed in § 402 
permits. This brings a political dynamic to water quality-based effluent 
limitations. As pressure mounts on § 402 permittees to meet the standards, they 
will push for action on other contributors to degraded water quality, which are 
commonly referred to as nonpoint sources of pollution. 
Section 402 permits can be issued on a general or an individual basis. There 
are regional and state-specific general permits for some livestock operations.30 
3. Scoping Approaches 
Most CWA disputes involve scoping questions with institutional and 
technical aspects. The institutional aspect concerns the extent and effectiveness 
of the federal government vis-à-vis the states in matters pertaining to the 
environment and land use, and all the associated activities those bodies of law 
affect (which is to say, nearly everything). For a time, arguments about the 
federal Commerce Clause proliferated, until the Court concluded the statutory 
language was not susceptible to a commerce-based construction, even in the 
hands of the EPA.31 Since then, a continued strong sense of a limited federal 
government attends efforts at providing a scope to the CWA. 
The CWA’s ambitious goal, however, cuts against limited-scope 
understandings: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”32 This goal has, at times, driven EPA’s efforts 
at expansiveness in CWA implementation. Achieving this goal is technically far-
reaching. Water quality is everywhere. The nation’s main rivers collect water 
from overland runoff and aquifer discharges. That is why they are navigable, in 
fact. Therefore, through precipitation, everything that humans do on land has 
some impact on water quality. 
The CWA does not regulate precipitation, obviously, but its concern for 
water quality at one place in the system (navigable waters) means that it 
necessarily must look beyond that place to improve water quality. How far it may 
go is the great question facing the CWA’s scope. For decades, we have focused 
on the destination of pollutants to define this scope in the extended fights over 
WOTUS.33 
In addition to WOTUS, CWA scoping has involved some attention to the 
origins of pollution—point sources. The term “point source” has a corollary in 
the concept of nonpoint-source pollution. While the term “nonpoint” is used in 
the statute,34 it is not defined.35 Generally, it is regarded as anything that is not a 
 
30.  Though general permitting for CAFOs has been somewhat controversial, see Terence J. Centner, 
Courts and the EPA Interpret NPDES General Permit Requirements for CAFOS, 38 ENVTL. L. 1215 (2008). 
31.  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 173; Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
32.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2021). 
33.  See supra note 27. 
34.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 1288(b)(2)(F) (2021). 
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point source.36 But given the breadth of point sources, it is difficult to discern 
what sources are nonpoint sources.37 The question becomes significant to the 
scoping issue because the CWA largely leaves nonpoint sources in the hands of 
states. The provisions found in the CWA try to spur state action by requiring 
planning, funding, and state-chosen controls; but they do not force state action.38 
To confuse matters somewhat (which further opens the door for scoping 
arguments) there are explicit and implicit variants of nonpoint sources under the 
CWA. Explicit nonpoint sources arise because the definition of “point source” 
specifically excludes some things that would otherwise qualify as point sources, 
including agricultural-stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture.39 Absent the explicit exception, both items would qualify as point 
sources. That is why they were specifically excluded. 
Beyond explicit nonpoint sources, there lies a category of pollution that is 
referred to as nonpoint because it does not fulfill the general point-source 
definition, involving a discrete conveyance. This implicit negative variant of non-
point sources lies in the shadow of a broad point-source definition, making it 
difficult to discern what types of pollutant releases are nonpoint. 
Matters become even more murky when one considers how pollutants 
typically enter the environment. Nearly all human-caused pollution is introduced 
to the environment from a point source. If the CWA has any limits to its 
applicability (which it surely has), then it must not reach all releases of 
pollutants. As a result, the implicit variant of nonpoint source pollution has been 
used to separate regulated discharges from unregulated ones. This scoping use of 
the term is a heavy lift for an undefined and uncertain term. 
Yet another scoping approach is also emerging, derived from the institutional 
and technical difficulties of federally regulating water quality. The link between 
origin and destination40 is emerging as the primary limiting concept in point-
source regulation.41 The Court in Hawaii Wildlife Fund recently discovered that 
concept’s relevance with groundwater-related discharges.42 But this scoping 
 
35.  Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 479, 480 (1989); Kyle W. Robisch, Getting to the (Non)Point: Private Governance as a Solution to 
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 67 VAND. L. REV. 539 (2014); Matthew A. Walker & A. Bryan Endres, A Nudge or 
a Shove: Environmental Federalism and Non-Point Source Pollution, 28 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2018). 
36.  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 235, 319. 
37.  Id. at 235–36. 
38.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1313, 1329 (2021); Mandelker, supra note 35. 
39.  There is a further exemption in § 402(l)(1) for “discharges composed entirely of return flows from 
irrigated agriculture” including silviculture. A much clearer way of excluding agricultural stormwater 
discharges from CWA permitting would have been to exclude such discharges from the definition of “discharge 
of pollutants,” or to have written an exception like § 402(l). Instead, they used the “discharge” to operate as an 
exception to a definition of a term (“point source”) that is used to define the term they used (“discharge”). Such 
circles are not a sign of good statutory drafting. 
40.  Adler & House, supra note 16. 
41.  Walker & Endres, supra note 35; Mandelker, supra note 35. 
42.  County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020); Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan 
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approach has been at work for decades in the analysis of precipitation-related 
CAFO discharges. This Article argues that the emerging case law is placing new 
emphasis on the link between destination and origin. Its development may better 
define the concept of nonpoint-source pollution, both the explicit and, more 
importantly, the implicit variant. In so doing, it may clarify difficult questions we 
have long wrestled with in the agricultural applications of the CWA. 
B. Agriculturally Relevant Provisions of the CWA 
Agriculture gets special treatment in both the § 404 and § 402 contexts. For 
present purposes, agriculture’s § 404 favoritism is not directly relevant.43 There 
are two other places in the CWA where agriculture gets special attention for 
§ 402 purposes. The first is in the definition of pollutants. Pollutants are defined 
to include “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, 
sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and 
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”44 
Agricultural interests have not (yet) made much of a fuss about how this 
definition limits the scope of the CWA’s application in agriculture.45 
The second is in the concepts of point and nonpoint sources.46 “Point source” 
is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but 
not limited to any . . . concentrated animal feeding operation . . . from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”47 Here, the textual reference to CAFOs 
 
Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2018); Tenn. Clean Water Network v. TVA, 274 F. Supp. 3d 775 
(M.D. Tenn. 2017), rev’d 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018). 
43.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2021). Section 404(f), provides exceptions for “normal farming activities,”for 
maintaining drainage ditches and farm ponds, and for the construction and maintenance of irrigation ditches. 
The exemptions are limited by a recapture provision that strips the activities of their exemptions if the discharge 
is “incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it 
was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of 
such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.” Id. In addition to 404(f), there are 
several regulatory exceptions placed in the WOTUS regulations, as well as nationwide permits that functionally 
implement the 404(f) exception. 
44.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2021). 
45.  It is an open question as to whether the clause “discharged into water” modifies “industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural waste” in a way that distinguishes it from the other listed pollutants. Another 
construction is that the “discharged into water” clause modifies the entire list and, thus, serves only to duplicate 
the concept of discharge that is required under 33 U.S.C. § 1311 and defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362. The question 
arises with provisions of the CWA that pertain to non-point sources of pollution, like the development of 
TMDLs. A reading that defines pollutants to include only things that are discharged into water would limit 
TMDL development to point sources of pollutants because discharges require a point source. As a result, courts 
have largely ignored this language. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1351–52 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(considering sediment a pollutant for which a TMDL may be created even though it does not involve a point 
source and, thus, cannot be discharged into water). 
46.  John H. Davidson, Thinking About Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution and South Dakota 
Agriculture, 34 S.D. L. REV. 20 (1989). 
47.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2021). 
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requires regulation, in the event they discharge (i.e., add pollutants to navigable 
waters). 
As for nonpoint-sources, the definition goes on to exclude “agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”48 As 
mentioned, the explicit and implicit variants of nonpoint sources gleaned from 
this language make this area difficult, especially when combined with the 
institutional and technical drivers of the scoping effort that accompanies the 
CWA’s implementation. 
Matters come to a head with agriculture. The explicit exclusions are for 
agricultural-stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.49 
And agriculture is a widespread contributor of large amounts of pollutants into 
the environment, which are carried to navigable waters through the hydrologic 
system. As a result, reaching agriculture’s water-quality impact through the 
CWA puts a great deal of pressure on the nonpoint source provisions that are 
used to define the CWA’s scope. 
The nonpoint planning and funding provisions of the CWA also mention 
agriculture, but they only add to the confusion. In a state planning provision, the 
statute calls for the creation of the following: 
 
[A] process to (i) identify, if appropriate, agriculturally . . . related 
nonpoint sources of pollution, including return flows from irrigated 
agriculture, and their cumulative effects, runoff from manure disposal 
areas, and from land used for livestock and crop production, and (ii) set 
forth procedures and methods (including land use requirements) to 
control to the extent feasible such sources.50 
 
It is unclear to what extent this provision is referring to the explicit nonpoint 
sources of pollution, those sources that are implicitly nonpoint because they 
somehow do not involve discrete conveyances, or both. 
Taken together, these definitions and concepts impose a permitting 
requirement on CAFOs and other agricultural point sources that add pollutants to 
navigable waters. But “agricultural stormwater discharges” and irrigation return 
flows are not required to have a permit. These explicit agricultural nonpoint 
sources (along with an unknown set of implicitly nonpoint sources) are left to 
states without much federal oversight. And while nonpoint-source pollution may 
involve “runoff from manure disposal areas and from land used for livestock and 
 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (2021). Subsection (j) includes a cost-sharing program with USDA that 
allows it to enter contracts with “owners and operators having control of rural land for the purpose of installing 
and maintaining measures incorporating best management practices to control nonpoint source pollution for 
improved water quality” to deal with the problems identified in subsection (b). § 1288(j). Another part of the 
CWA refers to “agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff from fields and crop and forest lands.” 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(A) (2021). 
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crop production,” CAFOs are point sources that must have a § 402 permit if they 
discharge pollutants to navigable waters. 
III. AGRICULTURAL INDIRECT DISCHARGES AND HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 
Agriculture’s contribution to water quality problems usually does not involve 
placing pollutants directly in navigable waters. Rather, its contribution typically 
involves an application of pollutants on land. Those pollutants are then carried to 
navigable waters through precipitation, or they may travel to navigable waters 
through groundwater. In either event, these indirect discharges are the primary 
source of uncertainty for § 402 permitting in agriculture.51 
The statutory language responsible for this uncertainty is the term “discharge 
of pollutants,” which is defined as “the addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source.”52 Stated more clearly, a discharge occurs when a 
point source adds pollutants to navigable waters. The crux of the uncertainty 
comes from what this language does not say. It does not say that point sources 
must directly add pollutants to navigable waters.53 To further complicate matters, 
the concepts of agricultural stormwater and nonpoint-source pollution muddle the 
discharge issue when precipitation contributes to the conveyance of pollutants to 
navigable waters. And because groundwater is generally excluded from CWA 
coverage, those pollutants traveling to navigable waters through groundwater 
raise indirect-discharge complications as well. 
Consider, for example, a CAFO in Nebraska. The Missouri River forms our 
eastern border. A release of manure into the Missouri River at Plattsmouth, 
 
51.  Adler & House, supra note 16, at 67, is a helpful read on the subject. The analysis here differs only 
slightly with their read of the statute. First, they spend no time on agricultural stormwater discharges, which is 
understandable. However, they spill considerable ink on Southview Farm as part of their evaluation of the 
conduit cases (of which Hawaii Wildlife Fund is a part). Agricultural stormwater was a significant part of that 
case, and the analysis presented here helps shed some light on the concept. Hopefully, I do so without atomizing 
the statute. In addition, I have a slightly different view of nonpoint sources of pollution, viewing them post-
Hawaii Wildlife Fund and in light of the agricultural-stormwater cases as those sources of pollution that are 
either excluded from the definition of point source (agricultural stormwater discharges or irrigation return 
flows) or those contributions that cannot be traced to a specific point source. 
52.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2021). This paper focuses on the “from” and “to” of the discharge definition. 
There has also been litigation on “addition.” Specifically, this line of authority questions whether the transfer of 
polluted water from different water bodies constitutes the addition of pollutants. On the one hand, such a 
transfer could involve moving polluted water to a less-polluted or un-polluted water body. But, on the other 
hand, the transferor (often a pumping station) adds no pollutants to the water it is moving. Both EPA and the 
Second Circuit have settled on the unitary-waters theory, which holds that simply moving water from one 
navigable water to another is not an addition of pollutants because the pollutants were already in the navigable 
waters, even if the receiving waters do not contain the same pollutants. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017), which collects the authorities and decides the issue. 
53.  Justice Scalia famously identified this aspect of the CWA in his Rapanos opinion, when he 
responded to a criticism about the impact his restricted view of navigable waters might have on the § 402 
program. As he noted, § 301 and § 402 do not require that pollutants be added “directly” or “immediately,” 
unlike § 404, which operates to permit only the placement of dredge and fill material in navigable waters. 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742–45 (2006), cited in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 
S. Ct. 1462, 1475 (2020). 
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Nebraska, would, of course, add pollutants to a navigable water. And since the 
CAFO is a point source, there would be a discharge. A release of manure into the 
Platte River (tributary of the Missouri River) near Columbus, Nebraska, about 
one hundred miles away, would as well. This could be because the Platte is 
navigable or because anything dumped in the river there will flow to Plattsmouth. 
Now, place the manure in the Dismal River—a much smaller stream that 
flows into the Platte—near Mullen, Nebraska, over three hundred miles from the 
Plattsmouth site. Or consider a release to a field abutting the Dismal where the 
manure is placed in a drainage way that leads from the field to the river, where 
the manure will be carried to the river when there is enough rain. Or consider an 
application to the surface of a sandy field near the Dismal where the nitrogen will 
be carried into the soils as it rains and will move through the spaces in the soil 
until it percolates to the Dismal with groundwater. Or consider any number of 
variations where the point source is farther removed from navigable waters and 
the confluence of time, rainfall, geography and geology impact the addition of 
pollutants to protected water. At what point does the release not add pollutants to 
those waters? Answering that question is both technically challenging and legally 
fraught, given the bounds of federal authority and the statutory text and 
purpose.54 
A. County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund 
In 2020, the United States Supreme Court decided County of Maui v. Hawaii 
Wildlife Fund,55 a case involving injection wells that placed pollutants into the 
underground portion of a hydrologic system.56 Those pollutants migrated to the 
navigable waters nearby because of the presence of water in the sub-surface 
geologic structure (i.e., groundwater). The placement of the pollutants into the 
hydrologic system involved a point source (the wells), so the question became 
whether there had been a discharge of pollutants—i.e., an addition of pollutants 
“from” the point source “to” navigable waters (the nearby coastal water 
surrounding the island). The matter was legally complicated because 
groundwater is not a navigable water under the CWA. Indeed, groundwater 
protection raises significant questions about the CWA’s scope.57 Nonetheless, the 
Court concluded there may have been a discharge to navigable waters (the 
 
54.  The scope of indirect discharges is arguably much more important for § 402 permitting than the 
scope of the term navigable waters. The WOTUS question turns on which of these water bodies constitutes 
WOTUS (all of them do, probably), and what land features might qualify as WOTUS (none of them on these 
facts, probably). For § 402 purposes, the more important issue is where a point source could release pollutants 
and not add them to WOTUS. This is the indirect-discharge question. 
55.  140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). 
56.  LINDA TSANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10528, UNCHARTED WATERS: NAVIGATING THE 
SUPREME COURT’S NEW CLEAN WATER ACT PERMITTING TEST 5 (2020). 
57.  For an explanation of groundwater coverage, see Michael C. Blumm & Steven M. Thiel, 
Ground(Waters) of the United States: Unlawfully Excluding Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water Act 
Jurisdiction, 46 ENVTL. L. 333 (2016). 
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coastal waters) through groundwater, so long as the release of the pollutants was 
the “functional equivalent” of the quintessential end-of-pipe direct discharge into 
navigable waters. 
According to the Court: 
 
Time and distance are obviously important. Where a pipe ends a few feet 
from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel those few 
feet through groundwater (or over the beach), the permitting requirement 
clearly applies. If the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the 
pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other 
material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the 
permitting requirements likely do not apply. 
 
The object in a given scenario will be to advance, in a manner consistent 
with the statute’s language, the statutory purposes that Congress sought 
to achieve. As we have said (repeatedly), the word “from” seeks a “point 
source” origin, and context imposes natural limits as to when a point 
source can properly be considered the origin of pollution that travels 
through groundwater. That context includes the need, reflected in the 
statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater and other nonpoint 
sources of pollution. Whether pollutants that arrive at navigable waters 
after traveling through groundwater are “from” a point source depends 
upon how similar to (or different from) the particular discharge is to a 
direct discharge.58 
 
In articulating that test, the Court identified seven factors: 
 
(1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material 
through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant 
is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant 
entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that 
leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant 
enters the navigable waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that 
point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and distance will be the 
most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.59 
 
Unfortunately, the Court tells us nothing about how much time and distance 
is too much for a release “from”60 a point source to no longer constitute an 
addition to navigable waters.61 And without some indication of what the 
 
58.  Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1476. 
59.  Id. at 1476–77. 
60.  While the Court focuses on “from” in the statute, one could easily focus on “to” as well. See id. In 
either event, the question is whether there is a sufficient link between the point source and navigable waters. 
61.  One possible way of considering the line that Hawaii Wildlife Fund wants courts to draw is to 
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functions of a direct discharge are, it is difficult to consider equivalency.62 
The Court added several observations about the common-law method and 
state regulation of groundwater and nonpoint-source pollution, nodding to the 
scoping approaches to the CWA outlined above.63 It was, however, very 
cognizant of the potential for a strict direct-discharge rule to result in evasion of 
the CWA’s coverage.64 
Importantly, and accurately, the Court did not use the feasibility of § 402 
permitting or amenability to effluent limitations as indicators. The “discharge of 
pollutants” question logically and textually precedes the permit question, given 
the general prohibition on discharges found in § 301. The existence of a 
discharge (and by necessity a point source) should not be determined based on 
the permit opportunities under the CWA. In fact, some discharges might not 
qualify for permits under either § 402 or § 404.65 This does not mean there is no 
 
consider it in hydrogeologic terms, like what occurs with water-quantity management. In Colorado and 
Nebraska, for example, we regulate groundwater pumping when it has too much of an impact on surface water 
flows. While the regulations we implement are very different, both states must consider the scope of activities 
that affect surface-water availability enough to justify regulation. In Colorado, this concept is called “tributary 
groundwater.” J. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater: Implications for 
Nebraska, 83 NEB. L. REV. 541 (2004). 
In Nebraska, our integrated-management approach identifies areas subject to regulation by using a 10/50 rule. 
To facilitate the determination as a policy-based decision, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources 
considers hydrologically connected area to be the area in which pumping of a well for 50 years would deplete 
streamflow by at least 10% of the amount pumped. Ruopu Li et al., Evaluating Hydrologically Connected 
Surface Water and Groundwater Using a Groundwater Model, 52 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 799 
(2016). 
The difficulty in applying this concept to the CWA is the language used. Interpreting the terms “addition”, “to”, 
and “from” do not easily bring to mind questions of the significance of the impacts. Nonetheless, perhaps 
similar modeling could be used to determine a geographic area within the reach of navigable waters where 
releases of pollutants will reach those waters soon enough and at high enough concentrations to qualify as 
discharges. 
62.  Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1485–86 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
For other tests that were under consideration, see Adler & House, supra note 16, at 93–94. The Court rejects the 
Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test, but it is not clear how the two tests differ from one another. See Tenn. 
Clean Water Network v. TVA, 273 F. Supp. 3d 775 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (“[T]he requirement that a plaintiff be 
able to trace pollutants’ passage from their source to navigable waters does not require that the plaintiff be able 
map every inch of that path with perfect precision. To some degree, a hydrologic connection’s traceability is a 
feature not of the connection itself, but the physical and technological limitations surrounding the parties’ 
observation of it. In a world of perfect knowledge, all hydrologic connections, no matter how general or 
attenuated, would be traceable—but that does not mean that Congress intended to reach all such connections 
with the CWA. By the same token, in the considerably more technologically primitive world of the past, one 
presumably could not trace water flows that could not be seen with the naked eye, but those invisible 
hydrological connections were no less real or substantial than they are today. Perfect traceability is ultimately a 
technological and epistemological issue, not a legal one. As long as a connection is shown to be real, direct, and 
immediate, there is no statutory, constitutional, or policy reason to require that every twist and turn of its path 
be precisely traced.”); see also Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018). 
63.  Infra Subsection II.A.3. 
64.  Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. at 1474–76 (majority opinion) (noting the “serious loophole” such 
an approach would create). 
65.  One example would be pipeline ruptures. Pipelines would likely not be amenable to § 402 permits or 
the creation of effluent limitations. Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (providing an example of a case involving such a discharge). In such cases, a violation of the CWA 
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discharge. It only means the discharge cannot be permitted. 
The EPA issued guidance that adds an eighth factor: “the design and 
performance of the system or facility from which pollutants is released.”66 After 
setting forth this factor, the EPA adds that these designs can affect the application 
of all the other factors in the list. While this is true, it proves a bit too much. 
After all, the inquiry will be undertaken according to how the specific structure 
was designed and is performing. So that factor seems built into the analysis 
already. To the extent it is not, it could be that the EPA is looking at anticipated 
performance as an indicator of foreseeability or, perhaps, intent. Neither of those 
concepts, however, appear explicitly in the standard the Court adopted, but they 
are common concepts associated with causal inquiries that often focus on the 
appropriate connection between a stimulus and a result. That seems to fit with the 
inquiry in question—determining whether the release of pollutants from the point 
source was causally related enough to the pollutants’ presence in navigable 
waters to constitute a “discharge.” 
The guidance also notes that conveyances through groundwater may involve 
much less pollutant than similar discharges that are directly to navigable waters. 
It is difficult to understand what this factor has to do with applying Hawaii 
Wildlife Fund. The amount of pollutant does not seem relevant to whether a point 
source adds pollutants, but perhaps very low volumes or concentrations are not 
the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the same point source. In this 
regard, the observation seems to repeat the fifth Hawaii Wildlife Fund factor. 
B. CAFO Discharges and Agricultural Stormwater 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund raises as many questions as it answers, but it may turn 
over a new leaf in CAFO permitting and agricultural discharges generally. 
Indirect discharges have a long history in CAFO regulation.67 Even though the 
CWA includes these operations explicitly as an example of a “point source,” 
their coverage has always been difficult to reconcile with the general definition 
of point sources, which describes structural conveyances: “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance.”68 That reconciliation is, however, necessary. 
 
may occur. 
66.  Anna Wildeman, Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund Decision in 
the Clean Water Act Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Program, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/guidance-memorandum-applying-supreme-courts-county-maui-v-hawaii-wildlife-
fund-decision-clean (last visited Feb 12, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
67.  See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 836 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2016); Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. 
EPA, 635 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2011); Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005); Concerned 
Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 
931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991); Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Alt 
v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D.W. Va. 2013); Scott Jerger, EPA’s New CAFO Land Application 
Requirements: An Exercise in Unsupervised Self-Monitoring, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91 (2004). For a helpful 
explanation of regulatory development, see Kenyon, supra note 13. 
68.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2021). 
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After all, the CWA does not regulate additions of pollutants from “point sources 
and CAFOs.” Rather, it regulates the additions of pollutants from “point 
sources,” of which CAFOs are an example. 
1. CAFO Discharges Generally 
Early cases grappled with the idea of a CAFO as a point source, often 
looking for the discrete structural conveyances that may be found within such 
operations. Outfall structures, ditches, drains, and pipes all appear when we take 
a closer look at CAFOs,69 and effluent limitations are written to deal with the 
design of such structures.70 But the biggest contribution that CAFOs make to 
water quality problems is from the land-application areas where manure is 
applied for disposal. Drawing on the § 404 cases that found equipment to be a 
point source,71 courts decided that manure-application equipment is a point 
source, as well as any identifiable ditches or other discrete conveyors of 
pollutants from land-application areas.72 
With these intra-CAFO point sources in mind, devising effluent limitations 
for the CAFO becomes a more coherent task. Structural-design requirements, 
prescribed management practices, and record-keeping obligations can be 
imposed to ensure that discharges (releases from these structures and equipment) 
involve as little pollutant addition to nearby waters as is technically and 
economically achievable.73 These permits can then be adjusted for any further 
water quality-based limits that nearby waters need. 
But this is agriculture, and resistance is the backdrop. That resistance 
affected the original design of the CWA, including its nonpoint source 
provisions. Recall that this is where one finds mention of nonpoint source 
planning processes that seek to identify “agriculturally related nonpoint sources,” 
including “runoff from manure disposal areas, and from land used for livestock 
 
69.  Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t, 34 F.3d at 118–19 (evaluating swale, pipe, and manure 
spreaders, and citing U.S. v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983); U.S. v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 
1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Voyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
70.  40 C.F.R. § 412 (2021). CAFO production areas, as opposed to land-application areas, are often said 
to have no-discharge limits. This is not entirely correct because the standards associated with their construction 
allow wastewater discharges in the event of significant rainfall events. See 40 C.F.R. § 412.31(a) (2021) (stating 
BPT for cattle that is used for BCT, BAT, and NSPS for cattle and swine production areas). These provisions 
are included in the regulations as effluent limitations, and those regulations have been reviewed in litigation as 
such. Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). As a result, the most coherent account of the 
provisions attending production areas is that they are effluent limitations, imposed through permitting 
requirements, that articulate the standards that must when the production area discharges. 
71.  See Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983) (interpreting 
point source to include bulldozers and backhoes); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t (CARE) v. Sid 
Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (E.D. Wash. 1999). 
72.  Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Constitutes “Point Source” of Pollution Subject to Control by 
Provisions of Clean Water Act, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2018). 
73.  40 C.F.R. § 412 (2021). 
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and crop production.”74 When that provision was not enough to eliminate CWA 
coverage of collected runoff discharges, Congress added an exception for 
agricultural stormwater discharges.75 So by the time CAFO permitting was 
ramping up, the 1987 amendments put the agricultural-stormwater-discharge 
exemption in play. All of this gave CAFOs an opportunity to argue that 
precipitation-related discharges were explicitly exempt as nonpoint agricultural-
stormwater discharges or that they fell within the implicit category of nonpoint-
source pollution. 
As a factual matter, the opportunity arose because precipitation plays a part 
in the conveyance of CAFO pollutants to navigable waters. To qualify as a 
discharge, the point source must add pollutants to navigable waters. With CAFO 
point sources, navigable waters were often some distance away from land-
application areas and precipitation was involved to a lesser or greater extent in 
the addition of pollutants to navigable waters.76 
2. CAFO Discharges and Hawaii Wildlife Fund 
Not all CAFOs raise precipitation-related discharge problems. In some parts 
of the country, CAFOs’ only connection to navigable waters is groundwater-
related. Obviously, Hawaii Wildlife Fund requires a reconsideration of their 
status as dischargers.77 In such areas, precipitation may infiltrate the earth’s 
surface and become groundwater, which then becomes surface water as it 
percolates to a stream.78 Such a connection between origin and source is clearly 
within the scope of Hawaii Wildlife Fund. 
As for precipitation-related discharges, Hawaii Wildlife Fund helps us better 
understand the concept of indirect discharge. If precipitation and overland runoff 
are basically like groundwater in the sense that released pollutants can sometimes 
travel through such runoff without eliminating the status of the release as a 
discharge, then the case provides a standard for when a CAFO discharges.79 
 
74.  33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (2021). 
75.  Davidson, supra note 46, at 35–36. 
76.  CAFOs include production areas as well, but for present purposes, I will largely limit the discussion 
to land application areas, which is where most manure finds its way into navigable waters. 
77.  See, e.g., Nat’l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009) (requiring a discharge for CWA 
coverage); Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring a discharge for CWA 
coverage). 
78.  Because the focus here is on land-application areas, I have omitted discussion of manure storage 
structures. However, there is a strong argument that lagoons leaching pollutants to nearby surface waters via 
GW are discharges. In such a case, the most coherent view is that the conveyance to the lagoon was the point 
source. But the lagoon may be a point source as well. See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. TVA, 273 F. Supp. 3d 
775, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 2017), reversed 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018). 
79.  See United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 947 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (evaluating 
a discharge to a city sewer system and concluding “the fact that defendant may discharge through conveyances 
owned by another party does not remove defendant’s actions from the scope of this Act. Defendant knows or 
should have known that the city sewers lead directly into the Mississippi River and this is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of discharging into ‘water of the United States.’”); Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 
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Whether or not a particular release of pollutants qualifies as a discharge, of 
course, turns on several factors related to functional equivalency. But the concept 
deals with the evasion problem, provides a workable scoping approach, and helps 
us understand how CAFO discharges qualify as such. 
The biggest hurdle to the full recognition of Hawaii Wildlife Fund in the 
precipitation-related CAFO-discharge setting is the agricultural-stormwater-
discharge exception. Some courts have used this provision to eliminate all 
precipitation-related discharges from coverage, in much the same way as some 
argued the Supreme Court should have done with groundwater in Hawaii 
Wildlife Fund.80 Other courts have not taken this approach, preferring to focus on 
the causal link between CAFO releases of pollutants and their presence in 
navigable waters. EPA’s regulatory treatment of CAFO land applications also 
appears to take this approach. Hawaii Wildlife Fund may settle this dispute, 
driving courts toward a causal inquiry that asks whether precipitation (as with 
groundwater) operates to distance the release of pollutants from navigable water 
too much.81 
The following sub-sections explain how current doctrine and regulations are 
currently using the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exemption. These uses are 
flawed and unnecessary in light of Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which provides limits 
on the concept of indirect discharges falling within the scope of the CWA. 
a. Doctrinal Impacts 
Generally speaking, integrating the agricultural-stormwater-discharge 
exclusion with CAFO regulation produced case law that expressed a judgment 
about what rainfall had to do with the addition of pollutants to navigable water. 
This is, of course, no simple matter. Absent a direct addition of pollutants on a 
dry day, rainfall always has something to do with a discharge from land-
application areas.82 For courts evaluating whether rainfall should sometimes or 
always preclude a discharge finding, they often framed the no-discharge 
conclusion in agricultural-stormwater terms, concluding that a covered CAFO is 
 
421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005). 
80.  County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1488 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
81.  A similar limit is found in the evidentiary aspects of liability. That is, in order to prove a discharge of 
pollutants from a point source to navigable waters, it will be necessary to show that the person under 
examination released a pollutant from a point source that ended up in navigable waters. Tracking pollutants 
from water bodies to their source in a way that serves to attribute liability to the polluter limits the reach of the 
CWA. Such a link might be thought of as factual link, akin to but-for causation. The need for a proximate-cause 
overlay—as a way to implement liability justifications—is one way of looking at Hawaii Wildlife Fund. 
82.  Rainfall is often included in open storage structures too, like lagoons. But most would not say that 
such structures are merely holding agricultural stormwater that may be discharged at will. But see Fishermen 
Against the Destruction of the Env’t v. Closter Farms, 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). The key to 
understanding the treatment of such facilities is to look to the source of pollutants found in those structures. If 
those sources are point sources, then the lagoon is merely a conduit. 
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an exempt agricultural-stormwater discharger.83 
As the Second Circuit put it in Concerned Area Residents for the 
Environment v. Southview Farm, “there can be no escape for liability for 
agricultural pollution simply because it occurs on rainy days.”84 Rather, the 
question is one of causation: “Whether the discharges were the result of 
precipitation,” or rather, “simply occurred on days when it rained.”85 Applying 
this standard, the court found that the land-application discharges at issue were 
discharges because “the run-off was primarily caused by the over-saturation of 
the fields rather than the rain” and the discharge was “unaffected by rain.”86 As a 
result, the court concluded that rainfall did not make the discharges at issue (from 
swales, pipes and manure spreaders) into agricultural stormwater discharges. 
In Alt v. EPA,87 the court concluded that rainfall-related conveyances of 
pollutants from a chicken CAFO were not discharges because they fell within the 
agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception. The alleged point sources in this 
case were exhaust fans that blew ammonia-laden dust, manure, and other 
pollutants out of the production barns where it settled on adjacent grassy areas. 
When it rained, these pollutants were carried to nearby navigable waters. The 
court concluded that “the manure and litter in the farmyard would remain in 
place and not become discharges of a pollutant unless and until stormwater 
conveyed the particles to navigable waters.”88 To this court, an addition that 
would have occurred in the absence of rain is a discharge, but those additions that 
would not have occurred in the absence of rain are not discharges because they 
constitute agricultural-stormwater discharges. 
The cases may be using different standards. Southview Farm seems open to 
the idea that causation is more nuanced than a but-for relationship. Alt does not 
have a similar tone. But, in both cases, the courts play fast and loose with the 
notion of agricultural-stormwater discharges, making it the focus of their inquiry. 
The statutory text excludes “agricultural stormwater discharges” from 
permitting requirements. The plain-language view of this phrase is that it 
excludes discharges of agricultural stormwater. That is, it applies to those 
ditches, pipes, and the like which add agricultural stormwater to navigable 
waters. As such, it provides an important exclusion in agriculture. There are a 
number of drainage districts, for example, that convey agricultural runoff to 
navigable waters.89 The exclusion clearly covers those point sources that add 
 
83.  Jerger, supra note 67 (containing a complete discussion of the land-application cases). 
84.  34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994). 
85.  Id. at 121. 
86.  Id. (emphasis added). 
87.  Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D.W. Va. 2013); a thorough discussion of Alt can be found in 
Kenyon, supra note 13. 
88.  Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
89.  Recent litigation concerning the Des Moines water works sought to attribute CWA liability to 
drainage districts. To the extent such entities carry “agricultural stormwater”, they are excluded by this 
exception. There is, however, an argument that they are carrying percolating groundwater, which originates as 
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agricultural stormwater to navigable waters.90 But it does not clearly cover those 
point sources releasing pollutants onto landscapes where they are then carried to 
protected waters in stormwater. The point sources making such releases are not 
discharging agricultural stormwater. 
Limiting the exception to channelized conveyances of agricultural 
stormwater is consistent with the purpose and history of the exception. The 
agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception was added to the CWA in 1987, 
alongside amendments dealing with municipal and industrial stormwater.91 These 
other amendments also clearly referred to the conveyances of stormwater, which 
were determined to qualify as discharges through litigation.92 Excluding 
agricultural stormwater reflects a judgment that agricultural drainage systems 
should not be treated as point sources (even though they are point sources).93 It 
does not, however, mean that originating releases of pollutants should not be 
regulated. That question is simply unaddressed by the agricultural-stormwater-
discharge exception. 
Southview Farm and Alt do not read the exception this way. Abandoning the 
text, they read it as precluding at least some precipitation-caused discharges.94 
 
rainfall, but does not move on the surface. Whether or not this distinction matters is an open question. The 
plaintiffs in the Des Moines Water Works case argued that it did matter and, because the defendant districts 
were conveying contaminated groundwater, they fell outside of the agricultural stormwater exception. For a 
description of the litigation, see Coppess, supra note 15, at 364–66. The definition of “storm water” found in the 
regulations appears to cover only surface sources: 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13) (2021) (“Storm water means storm 
water runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage.”). The oxford comma preceding the first “and” 
indicates that the last “and” operates conjunctively to make “surface” a modifier of “runoff and drainage.” This 
scope of this definition’s applicability is also unclear. The statute does not define “stormwater.” 
One must also draw a distinction between the sort of conveyance that would qualify as a discharge in the 
absence of the agricultural-stormwater exception and water transfers which do not qualify as discharges for lack 
of an “addition” of pollutants to navigable waters. See Chase Corey, Note, Concerning Catskill: Missed 
Opportunity, Broken Precedent and the Plight of American Waters, 44 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
597 (2020). 
Even though drainage-district permittees would not add pollutants to the stormwater they are carrying, they do 
convey polluted water (which has not yet become part of the navigable waters) to navigable waters. In such a 
case, the “unitary waters” theory does not hold up. Rather, the pollutants come from the “outside world.” 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001). 
90.  For a similar result, see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013) (concluding that logging 
road ditches discharging stormwater were exempt under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1) (2013)). 
91.  Davidson, supra note 46, at 35. 
92.  Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Nat. Res. 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
93.  Such a construction is also consistent with the CWAs notion of effluent limitations. Whether 
technology-based or water-quality-based, applying them to outlet structures of agricultural stormwater is 
exceedingly difficult because the composition of stormwater varies depending on unpredictable factors like 
land-use practices and rainfall. For the same reason, the permitting scheme for municipal and industrial 
stormwater was modified and placed in § 402(p).  Agriculture was relieved of that obligation. But it remains 
responsible for its remaining point source discharges. 
94.  There is, however, one reading of Southview Farm, but not Alt, that involves a correct application of 
the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception. Recall that one of the point sources that the court recognized 
were ditches and swales carrying runoff from the land-application area to navigable waters. These point sources 
may well enjoy an exception from the CWA, if they are carrying agricultural stormwater. Whether they are or 
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This is an understandable error given the amorphous nature of CAFOs as point 
sources and the lack of any apparent limit on precipitation-related discharges.95 
The need for a causal limit on the CWA’s scope drove the courts toward this 
textually flawed interpretation of the exception. Hawaii Wildlife Fund deals with 
the same problem, but it provides a better solution. It requires courts and 
regulators to focus on the concept of discharge, which tends to the specific origin 
of pollutants and evaluates the connection between it and navigable waters. 
Unpermitted direct discharges, or their functional equivalents, violate the CWA. 
The presence of stormwater, as with groundwater, does not eliminate the 
possibility of a discharge. 
b. Regulatory Impacts 
The EPA’s regulation of land-application discharges96 rejects the strict view 
of precipitation-related discharges found in Alt and the somewhat broader causal 
connection used in Southview Farm. However, like those cases, the regulation 
also confusingly involves the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception.97 The 
regulation begins with a relatively uncontroversial rule concerning what a 
discharge is: “The discharge of manure . . . to waters of the United States from a 
 
not depends on what they are conveying. The presence, or not, of precipitation in that collection may be the 
determining factor. See Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env’t v. Closter Farms, 300 F.3d 1294 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (concluding that pumping collected rainfall runoff from a farm into a neighboring lake was an 
agricultural stormwater discharge); see also Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D.W. Va. 2013) (involving a 
dispute about industrial v. agricultural). This reading of Southview Farm is consistent with a proper 
understanding of the exception. But it does not affect the existence of discharges preceding the exempted 
stormwater discharge that are added to navigable waters through stormwater. That is a question that Hawaii 
Wildlife Fund answers. 
95.  I am indulging the assumption that such a limit is necessary, as does every argument concerning the 
proper scope of the CWA. It would appear that it is, but not necessarily from the text of the CWA. Rather, as 
the Court in Hawaii Wildlife Fund concluded, such limits derive from state authority over land use and non-
point source pollution, and perhaps other factors like legislative history. 
96.  Notably, the EPA regulations of production areas and storage facilities do not mention the 
agricultural-stormwater exception. The basis appears to be that these structures are not mere conveyors of 
agricultural stormwater (even though they may contain some rainfall). They are the sources of agricultural 
pollutants that add pollutants to navigable waters and under certain conditions may be allowed to. This gets at 
the heart of the CWAs approach to pollution control. To the extent excessive rainfall means that a particular 
discharge will not be harmful to navigable waters, criteria can be written as effluent limitations to incorporate 
that idea. And they are. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 412.31 (2021); supra note 70. 
97.  To make matters worse, the court in Waterkeeper affirmed the EPAs effort as a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute, drawing on Southview Farm’s causal analysis and an undocumented legislative 
purpose. The court cited Southview Farm’s “primary cause” test with approval. Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 
399 F.3d 486, 509 (2d Cir. 2005). The regulation was also consistent with legislative purpose according to the 
court: “With respect to legislative purpose, we believe it reasonable to conclude that when Congress added the 
agricultural stormwater exemption to the Clean Water Act, it was affirming the impropriety of imposing, on 
‘any person,’ liability for agriculture-related discharges triggered not by negligence or malfeasance, but by the 
weather — even when those discharges came from what would otherwise be point sources. There is no 
authoritative legislative history to the contrary.” Id. at 508. Of course, there was no legislative history in support 
of this conclusion either. The court concluded: “The CAFO Rule seeks to remove liability for agriculture-
related discharges primarily caused by nature, while maintaining liability for other discharges.” Id. at 508–09. 
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CAFO as a result of the application of that manure . . . by the CAFO to land areas 
under its control is a discharge from that CAFO.”98 This identifies the 
“application of that manure” as the source of the ensuing discharge of the manure 
to waters of the United States and frames the causal connection as ‘from” or “as a 
result of” such applications. 
The regulation then provides an exception to this rule that invokes the 
agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception: 
 
[E]xcept where it is an agricultural storm water discharge. . . . For 
purposes of this paragraph, where the manure . . . has been applied in 
accordance with site specific nutrient management practices that ensure 
appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the manure . . . as 
specified in § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix), a precipitation-related discharge of 
manure . . . from land areas under the control of a CAFO is an 
agricultural stormwater discharge.99 
 
The inline reference to § 122.42(e)(1) is a reference to the nutrient 
management plan. The nutrient management plan described in § 122.42(e)(1) 
includes several items related to storage and handling, all of which are imposed 
on discharging CAFOs as effluent limitations.100 The agricultural-stormwater-
discharge exception references a portion of these requirements—items (vi)–(ix). 
Those items require the CAFO to meet certain standards with its land application. 
Complying with those standards, in turn, means that the land-application 
activities will qualify for the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exemption, 
shielding the CAFO from any permitting requirements if there are no other 
discharges from the facility.101 
With the cross-reference spelled out, the regulatory exception for 
agricultural-stormwater discharges refers to a “precipitation-related discharge” 
where the manure was applied in a way that ensures adequate nutrient 
management and “site specific conservation practices . . . to control runoff” 
(among other things).102 Much like in Southview Farm and Alt, the exception is 
dealing with the causal role of precipitation in land-application discharges, but it 
does not appear to ask whether a discharge would have occurred but-for the rain 
or if it was “primarily caused by” the land application. Instead, if manure is 
applied according to the NMP standards, then any subsequent precipitation-
related conveyance of pollutants will not violate the CWA. But if manure is 
applied in violation of these standards, then rainfall carrying it will result in a 
 
98.  40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2021). 
99.  Id. 
100.  See also 40 C.F.R. § 412.4 (2021). 
101.  See Terence J. Centner, Addressing Water Contamination from Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, 28 LAND USE POL’Y 706 (2011); Jerger, supra note 67. 
102.  40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(e), 122.42(e)(1)(vi) (2021). 
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discharge, so long as the pollutants come “from” the CAFO “as a result of” land 
application. 
These regulations are far from a model of clarity, at least insofar as the 
precise point source is concerned. The opening rule refers to the land application 
as the point source. But the rule’s exception seems to refer to the means by which 
pollutants migrate from the land to protected waters (e.g., through ditches and 
swales), which might be point sources. If the exception is deeming those 
conveyances as discharges comprised of agricultural stormwater, then the 
exception presents a somewhat proper use of the agricultural-stormwater-
discharge exemption. But it is not clear why compliance with a NMP would 
make the content of such conveyances any more or less agricultural stormwater. 
And this account of the exception does little to explain why the initial land-
application is not a discharge. Hawaii Wildlife Fund provides a possible 
explanation: compliance with the NMP serves to eliminate the functional 
equivalence of the discharge. 
Like Southview Farm and Alt, the regulations use the agricultural-
stormwater-discharge exemption to express the idea that there is sometimes no 
discharge. This is unfortunate. The regulations effectively hold that the NMP-
compliant application of manure to land does not add pollutants to navigable 
waters because the pollutants should be taken up by the vegetation and contained 
by the structures.103 This is a conclusion about the existence of a discharge, 
reflecting a reasonable choice about when precipitation-related discharges of 
pollutants occur. It has very little to do with whether the CAFO is discharging 
agricultural stormwater. 
To say that compliance with an NMP means that the discharge now involves 
agricultural stormwater is inconsistent with the text of the agricultural-
stormwater-discharge provision and its purpose, which prohibit the regulation of 
those point sources discharging agricultural stormwater. With agricultural-
stormwater discharges properly understood, the regulation can be seen as a limit 
on indirect discharges.104 Hawaii Wildlife Fund explains this limit better. 
Through that lens, the regulation can be seen as defining the scope of discharges 
 
103.  There may not even be a pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2021) (defining pollutant as “agricultural 
waste discharged into water”). Leaving aside the question of “into water,” which is, hopefully, the same 
question as is presented with discharges, the term “agricultural waste” is relevant. For manure, and perhaps for 
other nutrient or pesticide applications, use in excess of agronomic purposes may be necessary for the 
discharged substance to constitute “waste.” See Nat’l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 936 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“we conclude that: so long as the chemical pesticide ‘is intentionally applied to the water [to perform a 
particular useful purpose] and leaves no excess portions after performing its intended purpose . . . it is not a 
“chemical waste,”‘. . . and does not require an NPDES permit.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 23, at 37–39; 
James D. Bradbury et al., Agriculture and Environmental Law: Focusing on Defense Strategies, 24 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 7 (2019) (discussing the implications of Cow Palace). 
104.  The regulation could also, perhaps, be understood as an effluent limitation on regulated indirect 
discharges, as is the case with precipitation-related discharges from production areas. See supra notes 70 and 
94. But its invocation of agricultural stormwater and its placement in 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 preclude such a 
reading. Effluent limitations are only invoked once a CAFO discharges, and those limits are found in 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 122.42(e) and 412.4 (2021). 
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to include more than direct discharges. Its implicit logic is that the link between 
land application (a point source) and navigable waters may involve precipitation. 
In fact, its imposition of NMP requirements may be the sort of thing that the 
EPA’s guidance memorandum suggests should be considered as part of the 
indirect-discharge analysis: Under the conditions presented in the NMP, a 




In the end, the Hawaii Wildlife Fund indirect-discharge standard may 
overturn pieces of existing case law and necessitate a reconfiguration of the 
regulatory language on CAFO land-application discharges. The Court’s analysis 
deals with the CWA-scoping problem that led to the misuse of the agricultural-
stormwater-discharge exception. If Hawaii Wildlife Fund were employed in this 
context, point sources applying manure that travels to navigable waters in 
conjunction with precipitation would be discharging pollutants within the 
meaning of the CWA if such additions are the functional equivalent of a direct 
discharge. One of the factors attending the functional-equivalence test could be 
compliance with an NMP. Such compliance or the presence of other factors that 
make the discharge too indirect should rightly result in a no-discharge 
conclusion. The agricultural-stormwater-discharge provision can then be left to 
exclude those structures conveying agricultural stormwater. 
C. Rethinking Nonpoint-Source Pollution 
There is another piece of the precipitation puzzle that causes some problems 
for reaching land-application discharges. One of the most-common observations 
concerning nonpoint-source pollution is that nearly everything in agriculture is 
nonpoint-source pollution, except CAFOs.105 Farm-field runoff is often deemed a 
nonpoint source.106 The statutory basis for this observation is not altogether clear. 
This observation could be a reference to the explicit variant of nonpoint 
sources (i.e., the ag-stormwater-discharge exception). To the extent that logic is 
employed, the analysis above disposes of the argument: agricultural-stormwater 
discharges are a discreet type of excluded point source, where what would 
 
105.  See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agriculture 
Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2013) (“Since agriculture is exempt from most CWA controls, including 
permitting requirements under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), pollution-
causing agricultural activities are classified as unregulated nonpoint sources.”); Mandelker, supra note 35; 
Walker & Endres, supra note 35, at 2–3; Robisch, supra note 35. 
106.  33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(A) (2021). It is tempting to consult the notion of diffused surface waters, as 
well. This term is used to identify waters that are not subject to appropriation, and it is used for purposes of 
common-law drainage liability. Once diffused surface waters are collected, the rules usually change for these 
purposes. The CWA exception seems to clearly operate on collected water, as explained above, which means 
that the notion of diffused surface water is not up to the task of defining stormwater. 
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otherwise be a point source conveys stormwater runoff from agricultural land. 
However, the observation could also be a reference to the implicit negative 
variant of nonpoint-source pollution. Such a reference often purports to describe 
those discharges that do not otherwise fulfill the statutory definition of a point 
source. But what, exactly, are those? Hawaii Wildlife Fund may help us 
understand this concept as a derivative of the term “discharge,” rather than as the 
negative connotation of “point source.” 
Textually, this is difficult. As discussed above, the statutory reference to 
nonpoint sources provides some examples of what should be included in 
nonpoint-source planning processes. While those provisions are not definitional, 
they provide support for the idea that at least some precipitation-related 
discharges are more appropriately addressed by state-level planning and 
implementation. But this concept is not necessarily derived from the definition of 
“point source.” Taken literally, the nonpoint-source reference to “runoff from 
manure disposal areas” would mean that there is no point source involved with 
the large swath of CAFO pollutant releases involving land application. If CAFOs 
are to be regulated, that cannot be the case. The court in Southview Farm had no 
trouble settling on the “real question” of causation, without spending time on 
whether a nonpoint source was involved. And, as discussed, Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund provides a better understanding of how precipitation relates to CWA 
discharges. 
Both Southview Farm and Hawaii Wildlife Fund make some reference to 
nonpoint-source pollution, but neither fully grapples with the relevance of the 
point source at issue.107 That is, once they identify the point source, the inquiry 
focuses on the connection between the release of pollutants from it and the 
pollutants’ ultimate presence in navigable water. The focus is on the connection 
between origin and destination. Such an analysis is always necessary because 
nearly all pollutants are released into the environment by a point source.108 But 
no one would seriously claim that every release of pollutants is a discharge. This 
isn’t because there is no point source involved. Rather it is because the 
connections between those sources and protected waters is too attenuated. 
CAFO land-application cases and Hawaii Wildlife Fund reveal a better way 
of distinguishing nonpoint-source pollution from regulated pollution. The key is 
not to focus on the implicit negative variant of “point source.” Rather, the 
 
107.  While Hawaii Wildlife Fund does not cite Southview Farm, it cites Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Rapanos which, in turn, cited Southview Farm. County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1475 
(2020) (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006)). 
108.  Davidson, supra note 46, at 32. And courts have supported broad interpretations of the term. The 
concept of a point source was designed to further this scheme by embracing the broadest possible definition of 
any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the waters of the United States. United States v. 
Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979). Earth Sciences remains the leading case on the subject. 
See Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 219 (2d Cir. 2009) (grappling with 
the question and ultimately assuming that a firing line at a gun range was a point source but concluding that no 
sufficient connection between it and the presence of lead in navigable waters had been established); see also 
Williams, supra note 72. 
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nonpoint-source category can be better understood as a reference to those 
pollution releases that fail to qualify as a “discharge of pollutants.” 
In fact, the nonpoint-source cases gave the Hawaii Wildlife Fund Court the 
doctrinal choices for groundwater-related discharges. The main characteristic of 
nonpoint-source pollution is often expressed in causal terms, much like 
Southview Farm’s resort to the “real cause.” For example, a commonly cited 
EPA statement on the matter states, “[nonpoint source pollution] is caused by 
diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources . . . In practical terms, 
nonpoint source pollution does not result from a discharge at a specific, single 
location (such as a single pipe) but generally results from land runoff, 
precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.”109 
Traceability quickly enters the mix as a frame for divining a direct enough 
relationship between the destination and the source of the pollutants. Traceability 
concepts were developed in nonpoint-source cases and used in indirect-discharge 
cases, which ultimately resulted in Hawaii Wildlife Fund. The lower court and 
the Supreme Court can therefore be understood as selecting the standard for 
indirect discharges from a family of approaches that were developed in the 
nonpoint-source branch of CWA doctrine as a scoping approach.110 All of these 
cases are driving at the same point: the inability to trace pollutants from 
navigable waters to specific sources is what puts some releases beyond the scope 
of the term “discharge of pollutants” and, thus, in the nonpoint-source category. 
In such cases, the CWA apparently concludes that the best we can do is identify 
the possible contributors and implement programs to reduce collective 
contributions that impair water quality. 
Taken in that light, Hawaii Wildlife Fund can be understood as rejecting a 
blunt approach that regards all indirect discharges as nonpoint. That is, the reason 
why something is a nonpoint source is because its release of pollutants is 
separated from the protected destination by so much interference that we cannot 
call it a discharge. That interference could be underground percolation, temporal 
delays, rainfall, snowmelt, distance, dilution, etc. But once the link between the 
point of origin and the protected destination becomes too attenuated, the point of 
origin can no longer be considered the source of the pollutant. Perhaps a better 
term for the implicit negative variant of nonpoint source pollution would be non-
discharge pollution. 
 
109.  Simsbury-Avon Preservation Club, Inc., 575 F.3d at 220 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA OFFICE OF 
WATER, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987), quoted in Tenn. Clean Water Network v. TVA, 273 F. Supp. 
3d 775, 828–29 (M.D. Tenn. 2017), reversed 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the district court’s 
“hydrologic connection theory” of discharge). 
110.  See Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Trs. for 
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) and Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 
F.3d 502, 508 (9th Cir. 2013) from the nonpoint source line as support for the fairly-traceable test it uses to 
develop the functional equivalence test). 
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D. Other Agricultural Discharges 
The emergence of a standard linking the origin and destination of pollutants 
is a welcome addition to the body of law defining the CWA’s scope. In the 
CAFO context, courts and regulators have been using the concepts of agricultural 
stormwater and nonpoint sources too broadly. Hawaii Wildlife Fund could help 
clear up some of the misunderstanding associated with agricultural-stormwater 
discharges and clarify the causal inquiry attending CAFO discharges, while 
giving a more coherent meaning to the concept of nonpoint-source pollution. 
If it does, Hawaii Wildlife Fund could have far-reaching impacts on 
agricultural pollution. Numerous pollutants are released on agricultural 
landscapes by planters, sprayers, fertilizer applicators, and non-CAFO manure 
spreaders. The application of Hawaii Wildlife Fund to CAFO discharges frees 
cases like Alt and Southview Farm (and the regulations) from their agricultural-
stormwater overtones. If the involvement of precipitation in a discharge does not 
always remove a pollutant release form the CWA’s point-source provisions, then 
there may be other unpermitted agricultural point sources that violate the CWA. 
As with CAFOs and the injection wells in Hawaii Wildlife Fund, there would be 
a need for a scoping approach that reflects the federal-state relationship, land-use 
and water authority, and practical administrability and evasion concerns. But the 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund standard provides such an approach. 
Beyond the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception and the concept of 
nonpoint-source pollution, there remains another provision that complicates 
CWA coverage of non-CAFO agricultural discharges on irrigated land. As with 
the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception, the CWA excludes “return 
flows from irrigated agriculture” from the definition of “point source.”111 Unlike 
the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception, this definitional exception does 
not refer to “discharges.”112 However, as with agricultural-stormwater 
discharges, there is no reason for the definitional exclusion of irrigation return 
flows unless they could be regarded as point sources, which only require a permit 
if and when they discharge. So there is very little reason to think that the 
irrigation-return-flow exception should operate differently than the agricultural-
stormwater-discharge exception. As a result, the proper application of this 
exception operates much the same as the agricultural-stormwater-discharge 
exception: it excludes channelized conveyances of irrigation return flows from 
CWA coverage. 
In addition to the definitional exception, § 402(l) excludes “discharges 
composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture” from § 402’s 
coverage.113 This additional exclusion bolsters the observation that the 
definitional exception is driven by “discharge” concerns, despite the absence of 
 
111.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2021). 
112.  Id. 
113.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2021). 
University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
595 
the term “discharge” in the definitional exception. Moreover, the types of 
discharges excluded in § 402(l) are further modified by the “composed entirely 
of” language. This further limits the circumstances under which the CWA 
exempts discharges of irrigation return flows.114 
Construed as such, Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s treatment of indirect discharges 
may mean that irrigation return flows can be the means by which pollutants reach 
navigable waters. In cases where coverage is sought, the regulated discharge is 
not the return flow. Rather, the regulated discharge is the addition of pollutants 
from whatever point released them onto the irrigated fields. Irrigation water (like 
groundwater and agricultural stormwater) does not necessarily eliminate CWA 
coverage. 
Given these potential impacts, one predictable response to Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund will be to criticize it as an expansion of the CWA’s coverage. Such an 
expansion should not be surprising. The CWA was written in broad terms. The 
standards associated with those terms may reasonably be applied in ways that 
accommodate change. So it makes sense that what may not have been a discharge 
in 1972 is a discharge in 2021, given our expanding knowledge of hydrologic 
systems. 
Whether Hawaii Wildlife Fund will, in fact, expand the scope of permitting 
requirements for agricultural pollution is unclear. Given the tile-drainage 
structures or terrace-drainage structures through which polluted water is removed 
from agricultural land in many parts of the U.S., we may find a relatively clear 
path from origin to destination. The size of farming operations (e.g., one 
producer’s equipment applying pollutants to hundreds or thousands of acres in a 
single watershed) and factors of time, distance, volume, and detectability may 
tend toward the discovery of more discharges as well. In relatively riparian areas 
involving porous soils or swift runoff, the conclusion may follow too. 
Importantly, this does not mean that individual permits would become the 
norm for planters, sprayers, fertilizer applicators, and manure spreaders. We 
might see the development of regional permits that require the observance of best 
management practices to control the amount of pollutant ultimately reaching 
navigable waters. Or we may develop something like a nutrient management 
plan, compliance with which reduces the functional equivalence of a release and 
makes the addition too indirect to constitute a discharge. Under any of these 
options there would at least be some renewed attention to the problem of 
agricultural pollution. 
If history is our guide, however, agricultural interests will resist this 
interpretation of the CWA. Even if these approaches come to fruition, those 
advocating for environmental improvement will need to monitor the ensuing 
 
114.  See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2019) (evaluating a 
suit against a drainage system and reversing summary judgment for the district because the purported discharge 
included pollutants that could not be attributed to irrigation return flows). 
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regulatory process. Capture is, after all, a pervasive phenomenon.115 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The constant search for limits on the CWA seems to be due at least in part to 
a belief long associated with it: it cannot go that far. But if we are serious about 
water quality, the CWA probably needs to go very far. Unfortunately, our 
institutional structures were not created with hydrologic systems in mind. And 
so, the search for limits persists. 
There are, of course, textual reflections of these limits in the CWA. It creates 
a subset of contributors to regulate (i.e., point sources) and it identifies a subset 
of waters to be protected (i.e., navigable waters). But the limits derived from 
these terms don’t answer the CWA’s scope questions very well. As much can be 
seen in cases where precipitation serves to help carry pollutants from point 
sources to navigable waters. And those cases are primarily found in agriculture 
because it involves the famous CAFO outlier in the point-source definition and 
long-running disputes about agricultural stormwater and nonpoint-source 
pollution. 
A close examination of CAFO coverage reveals the justification for 
including it within the point-source definition: CAFOs do, indeed, involve 
discrete conveyances to which effective limitations can be applied. And that 
examination also reveals significant questions about the path from point source to 
navigable waters. Often, the indirect-discharge reasoning from these cases is 
conflated with the agricultural-stormwater-discharge exception, but an accurate 
reading of that exception reveals that it textually and contextually refers to 
discharges of agricultural stormwater, not discharges through agricultural 
stormwater. Once properly construed, the task that remains is to provide a textual 
explanation for the CAFO cases that maintains the appropriate scope of the 
CWA’s coverage. Such a limit emerges from the discharge definition, which 
requires the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from a point source. 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund’s attention to discharges opens a new chapter in 
debates about the proper scope of the CWA. If applied in agriculture, it will have 
to overcome the current understanding of the agricultural-stormwater-discharge 
exception and the concept of nonpoint-source pollution. It may. After all, they 
emerged in the absence of a limit like that found in Hawaii Wildlife Fund. And 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund provides a limit—functional equivalence—which may do a 
better job than a flawed interpretation of the agricultural-stormwater-discharge 
exemption and a muddled understanding of nonpoint-source pollution. 
At the very least, this discussion demonstrates that the scope of the CWA 
 
115.  Michael Steeves, The EPA’s Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the Integrity of 
Our Nation’s Waters, 22 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 367 (2002); Chris Jones, MMPs are CRAP, IIHR–
HYDROSCIENCE & ENGINEERING (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.iihr.uiowa.edu/cjones/mmps-are-crap/ (on file 
with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
597 
may not be settled, and its concepts can be interpreted in adaptive ways. Even 
though the standards for origins and destinations of pollutants under the CWA 
may be somewhat clear, the path pollutants must take to justify the CWA’s 
prohibition and permitting provisions remains to be seen. For now, we have a test 
that may expand the scope of agriculture’s coverage under the CWA, at least in 
relatively riparian areas with a high level of hydrologic connectivity and, 
perhaps, in drained areas beyond riparian zones. That test has the potential to 
accommodate advances in hydrologic understanding. As a consequence, it may 
move more sources of pollution from the area of nonpoint nonregulation to the 
CWA’s discharge regime where water quality improvements are more likely. 
One can expect agriculture to argue for narrow interpretations that maintain 
its ability to bring environmental solutions to policymakers on a voluntary and 
funded basis. It has plenty of legal ammunition to use. But the CWA may yet 
provide some regulatory teeth to the environmental movement in agriculture. 
And if a legislative response ensues, at least a new conversation may be had in 
today’s political and technological setting. A few things have changed since 
1972, 1977, and 1987. 
Every winter in the Midwest, we see manure spreaders adding manure on top 
of frozen ground and snowpack. We all know that nearly all of it will be in the 
streams and rivers when it warms up. And throughout the year, new and larger 
pieces of equipment apply herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers to an industrial 
landscape drained by a labyrinth of tile, rivers, and streams. While we struggle to 
fund water-treatment facilities, one wonders why the sources of that pollution are 
not regulated. One cannot help but think that these polluters are no different than 
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